



Waxing Power, Waning Pollution: The Effect of COVID-19 on Russian Environmental Policymaking 
Christopher A. Hartwell 1,2 (chartwell@kozminski.edu.pl) 
Vladimir Otrachshenko 3,4,5  (votrachshenko@gmail.com) 
Olga Popova *3,6,4 (popova@ios-regensburg.de) 
 
1 Zurich University of Applied Sciences (ZHAW), School of Management and Law, Zurich, Switzerland 
2 Kozminski University, Warsaw, Poland 
3 Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast European Studies (IOS), Regensburg, Germany 
4 Graduate School of Economics and Management, Ural Federal University, Yekaterinburg, Russian 
Federation 
5 Far Eastern Federal University, Vladivostok, Russian Federation 
6 CERGE-EI, a joint workplace of Charles University and the Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of 
Sciences, Prague, Czech Republic 
 
* Corresponding author. Address: Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast European Studies, Landshuter 







Like most countries globally, COVID-19 continues to have a demonstrable health, economic, and 
environmental impact on Russia. The purpose of this paper is to examine the possible ramifications for 
environmental quality in Russia during and following the coronavirus pandemic. Our work builds on the 
framework of Elinor Ostrom, as we argue that the pandemic and subsequent lockdown in Russia has 
highlighted the need for a more polycentric, de-centralized approach to environmental protection. We 
provide evidence for this point using a novel econometric strategy: given the tight centralization of 
environmental policymaking, we proxy for de facto decentralization using the amount of influence a 
regional governor has at the federal level. Using timely data on pollution in major Russian cities both 
before and during the pandemic, we employ an instrumental variable analysis which shows that pollution 
in a particular Russian region is negatively related to the amount of influence a Russian governor has at 
the federal level. Thus, the more powerful a governor is in their ability to set their own course, the better 
results they have in environmental quality. We conclude that Russia’s environmental policy needs a 
fundamental rethink – and extensive decentralization – in a post-COVID-19 world. 
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Like most countries globally, COVID-19 has had a demonstrable health, economic, and environmental 
impact on Russia. From the first official cases recorded on January 31, 2020, to the surge in cases beginning 
at the end of March (28,248 new ones as of December 20, 2020), Russia has seen a cumulative total of 
over 2,500,000 citizens infected with the coronavirus and over 50,000 deaths. To combat the spread of 
the disease, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared a “national holiday” in late March which turned 
into more traditional lockdown measures across Russia’s regions, including social distancing, closure of 
“non-essential” businesses, and orders to stay at home except for essential services. With the prohibition 
on economic activity came a predictable contraction of economic activity across the country, and the 
Central Bank of Russia (CBR) is forecasting a drop in GDP in 2020 between 4% and 6%.  
The cessation of over a third (by some estimates) of Russia’s economy has resulted in environmental 
impacts as well, but in a manner which highlights the unsustainable nature of Russia’s current industrial 
complex. Various types of pollution and environment challenges have been problematic across Russia,1 as 
cities in central and northern Russia (and of course the capital of Moscow) have long been plagued by 
dangerous air quality – in February 2020, Krasnoyarsk was the most polluted city in the world with an air 
quality index (AQI) of 226 - while mining towns such as Norilsk suffer from the legacy of both air and water 
pollution (Hønneland and Jørgensen 2003) and continue to face ecological catastrophe (as in the diesel 
oil spill from Norilsk Nickel subsidiary Norilsk-Taimyr Energy's power plant in May 2020). The measures 
taken to prevent the spread of COVID-19 in its first wave in Russia have shifted the overall environmental 
 
1 Generally, environmental challenges in Russia can be classified into several categories, including climate change 
and its consequences, air pollution, water pollution, natural resources exploitation and waste management, 
preservation of biodiversity, and radiation hazards (Feldman and Blokov 2012; Henry and Douhovnikoff 2008; 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of the Russian Federation 2019; Smith 2006). For a discussion of 
socioeconomic consequences and economic policies related to other environmental issues in Russia, see, for 
instance, Otrachshenko and Popova (2019) and Otrachshenko et al. (2017, 2018, 2021) on global warming, Wiesmeth 
and Starodubets (2020) on waste management, Libman and Obydenkova (2014) on forestry, and Feldman and 




picture in Russia, however, as there was a dramatic decline in various types of pollution from the start of 
the pandemic, one which decreased further with increasingly stringent isolation orders in different 
regions. Of course, the vast Russian landmass saw environmental changes to different extents in different 
cities and at different times; in Moscow, for example, while some pollutants have remained at high levels, 
for the most part, air quality has improved demonstrably since the end of February (Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Plume Air Quality Index for Moscow, November 2019 – May 2020 
 
Source: Derived from data provided by Plume Labs World Air Map, https://air.plumelabs.com/air-quality-in-
moscow-2cy9. Air quality is calculated as a formula of thresholds of five major pollutants, namely O3, NO2, SO2, 
PM10, and PM2.5. 
Two specific factors have been driving Russia’s problematic environmental outcomes over the past 20 
years. The first, in line with the Coase (1960) Theorem, is a pervasive lack of property rights across Russia 
(Gans-Morse 2017), a situation which has created disincentives for environmental protection at the firm 
and individual level. Much as during Soviet times, the commons “were no one's property, they were under 
no one's protection” (Kotov and Nikitina 1993:12-13). At the same time, the tenuous nature of property 
rights in the country has allowed for a cozy alliance between business and politicians regarding 










































































































































































































































Soviet Union, while entrenching large state-owned companies in more pollution-intensive industries 
(Thorton 2009). Practically, this has resulted in “all types of costs associated with environmental 
protection… viewed as drains upon economic growth” (Kotov and Nikitina 1993:13), with government 
able to override individual preferences for cleaner air and water simply by holding the commanding 
heights of the economy.2 
The second issue behind Russia’s environmental degradation has been more pervasive and 
immediate than its overarching economic institutions and instead is related to its political institutions and, 
in particular, its environmental policymaking. Russia’s environmental policy (like much of its governance) 
is highly centralized and directed from the Kremlin (Martus 2017): despite a brief period of 
decentralization in the mid-1990s, the ascension of Vladimir Putin in 2000 returned ultimate oversight of 
environmental powers to Moscow, where it was combined with and subsumed to other economic 
imperatives, most notably natural resource extraction. Successive administrative reorganizations of the 
environmental bureaucracy have “led to overlapping jurisdictions that increase inspections without 
improving control [over environmental quality]” (Crotty and Rodgers 2012:15). In addition, this top-down 
environmental approach has created a massive disparity between federal policy formulated in Moscow 
and its implementation in the regions (Crotty 2003), leading to local concerns being bypassed (Hitchcock 
2011) and a perception that the Kremlin is forcing locals to conquer nature in order to raise revenue 
(Gladun and Zakharova 2017). 
During the coronavirus pandemic of 2020, these two issues have only intensified. The eagerness of 
Russian authorities to sacrifice environmental targets in favor of other policy goals was manifest in the 
government’s response to a letter from the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP) in 
 
2 According to the World Values Survey (wave 6) conducted in Russia in 2011, over 50% of respondents said that 
protecting the environment should be given a priority over economic growth and job creation, while 36% of 




April 2020 asking for a suspension of environmental regulations during the pandemic. The 73-point letter 
was not adopted in its entirety, but some points, including the suspension of public hearings on the 
environmental impact of projects and the postponement of the fulfillment of business reforestation 
obligations for up to three years, were accepted by the Ministry for Natural Resources and entered into 
force in July 2020 (see Alexandrov 2020). Additionally, while regions have been given some leeway in their 
handling of the lockdown, there has been no formal devolution of environmental protection; indeed, the 
government’s actions in the RSPP case have shown how the pandemic has further concentrated 
environmental policymaking power in Moscow over the heads of the regions. 
Given this state of affairs, the purpose of this paper is to examine the possible ramifications for 
environmental quality in Russia during and following the coronavirus pandemic. Our hypothesis builds on 
the framework of Elinor Ostrom (2009) and her husband and collaborator Vincent Ostrom (Ostrom et al. 
1961) on polycentrism, as we argue that the pandemic and subsequent lockdown has reinforced the need 
to move towards a more polycentric, de-centralized approach to environmental protection to deal with 
the diversity of Russia’s environmental issues (a point also made in Libman and Obydenkova [2014]). As 
suggested in Vincent Ostrom’s book examining the “compound republic” (V. Ostrom 1987), polycentrism 
offers a check on despotic tendencies emanating from the center (Wagner 2005), which, in the context of 
environmental policy, can override local desires for more environmental protection or prevent a healthy 
balance between resource use and environmental protection. Shifting towards polycentrism and away 
from monocentrism could also then allow for both improved environmental policymaking and outcomes 
informed by local desires (Newig and Fritsch 2009), even in a country such as Russia, where the top layer 
(and many layers underneath) of political institutions are themselves non-democratic. Indeed, the 
polycentric approach creates other poles of power centered on environmental protection – and beyond 
the formality of environmental policymaking - thus creating at the sub-national level a “demand [for] 




2020:18). In this sense, polycentrism creates mini-democracies and localized markets, processing and 
disseminating information that simply cannot be available to a policymaker eleven time zones away. 
We provide evidence for the possible effectiveness of polycentrism in Russia using a novel 
econometric strategy: given the tight centralization of environmental policymaking, we proxy for de facto 
decentralization using the amount of influence a regional governor has at the Kremlin. Using timely data 
on pollution in major Russian cities both before and during the pandemic, our econometric analysis shows 
that pollution in a particular Russian region is negatively related to the amount of influence a Russian 
governor has in the Kremlin.3 Thus, the more powerful a governor is in their ability to set their own course, 
the better results they have in environmental quality. We also show that a stricter self-isolation policy 
during the pandemic mediates this effect. 
Our contribution to the literature builds on a line of papers exploring the center-periphery governance 
relationships in Russia (for example, Turovskii [2010] or Reuter and Szakonyi [2019]), but the natural 
experiment of the coronavirus and ensuing lockdown allows us to explore the differential effects of 
governors on environmental outcomes in a short period of time. We are the first to our knowledge to 
provide empirical evidence for the importance of political influence on various environmental metrics in 
a highly centralized regime. This work will then have policy ramifications for Russia going forward as it 




3 Air quality was chosen because it is one of the most severe environmental problems in Russia. According to 
different estimates, a half to two-thirds of the Russian population lives in areas with air pollution levels exceeding 
air quality standards (Feldman and Blokov 2012; Smith 2006; Wernstedt 2002). Thus, while Russia’s environmental 
challenges are legion, air quality is the issue with the ability to affect the greatest number of Russians. Our focus on 
air pollution as an indicator of environmental quality is also driven by timely data availability, as we require an 
environmental quality indicator measured on a daily basis in 2020. Upon data availability in future, further studies 
are encouraged to analyze the consequences of COVID-19 and temporary decentralization in Russia on other 




II. Best Practices in Environmental Governance… 
Despite nearly a half-century of environmental regulations globally – and a much longer pedigree of 
private environmental initiatives – the keys to effective environmental governance and in particular 
environmental institutions remain contentious and, in many ways, under-explored. As Bennett and 
Satterfield (2018:1) note, “governance is one of the most important factors for ensuring effective 
environmental management and conservation actions. Yet, there is still a relative paucity of 
comprehensive and practicable guidance that can be used to frame the evaluation, design, and analysis 
of systems of environmental governance.”  
As Brondizo et al. (2009:523) noted, “proposals to protect… ecosystems by changing the institutional 
rules of use and by the way these rules are monitored and enforced, however, frequently focus on a single 
level. Most often this is at the level of national governments.” Advances in environmental governance are 
often also complicated by the fact that environmental governance is context- and path-dependent, and 
one-size-fits-all solutions have little effectiveness in the face of complex, trans-boundary environmental 
challenges (Scarlett 1997, Volokh et al. 1998, Epstein et al. 2015, Bodin 2017). At the same time, the 
political process through which much formal environmental policy at the national level runs is predicated 
on is dominated by particular interests and a lack of expertise (Oates and Portney 2003), meaning a focus 
on command and control and short-term metrics rather than tangible outcomes. In this sense, political 
institutions and their composition and/or ordering also have a major impact on environmental 
governance (Crepaz 1995, Bernauer and Koubi 2009, Liefferink et al. 2009, Jahn 2016) and can 
dramatically influence the path of environmental outcomes.  
An alternative to the top-down approach of environmental governance of common pool resources 
was suggested in the entire oeuvre of Elinor Ostrom, who examined localized, decentralized, and 
polycentric approaches to environmental policymaking (Ostrom 2009, 2010), a topic also favored and 




environmental challenges, especially in relation to common pool resources (where exclusion is costly and 
usage reduces availability for others, see Ostrom et al. [1999]), local solutions based on the knowledge of 
participants and repeated interaction yield better (and more sustainable) environmental outcomes 
(Newig and Fritsch 2009; Ostrom 2010). Such solutions would be predicated on inter alia rules that were 
appropriate to the local conditions, provided access to rule-making procedures for the vast majority of 
those affected, had conflict resolution mechanisms, were nested in multi-layer governance structures, 
and where the rights of localities to make their own decisions were respected by (or at least not unduly 
interfered with by) government (Cox et al. 2010). 
The beauty of a polycentric approach is the insight that actors may act independently of each other 
within a multi-layer governance system (V. Ostrom et al. 1961) and, most importantly, policies/rules need 
not necessarily be officially coordinated or approved. The recognition of this reality moves the focus on 
effective environmental decision making away from the nation-state – and its national government - as 
the sole unit of analysis, acknowledging that formal environmental policy is only one way (and not 
necessarily the best or even second-best way) in which environmental outcomes may be improved. As 
Forsyth and Johnson (2014:1104) note “an important aspect of polycentric analysis is its ability to 
incorporate a wide variety of formal/informal and state/non-state actors whose power to decide different 
resource governance outcomes varies in relation to different modes of governance.” This recognition of 
different poles of power connected to environmental decisions (taken at a local level and encompassing 
the actual implementation of environmentally relevant projects or actions), as opposed to merely policy 
(broader and generalized precepts usually codified in related to legislation and frameworks), means that 
polycentrism can exist even is a structure that is at its top layer non-democratic.  
Put another way, while the formal political system may restrict access for others in creating and 
implementing environmental policies, environmental decisions can still be taken at local and regional 




an adaptive manner, but improvements are predicated on “internal power dynamics among the 
components of a system, their competitive versus collaborative patterns of interaction, and the 
emergence of functional operational linkages” (da Silveira and Richards 2013:219).  In reality, marginal 
improvements may be found in polycentrism even if there is a high level of political centralization if the 
top layer of governance does not attempt to aggregate all the decision-making power for itself (Morrison 
et al. 2019): Libman and Obydenkova (2014) show this precisely in the case of Russia, where polycentrism 
worked for a time in forestry until the federal apparatus attempted to dominate other actors, while da 
Silveira and Richards (2013) show a similar pattern in China. In both cases, however, improvements were 
made in environmental protection at the local level across various environmental issues, but this progress 
was bounded by these same power relations and did not reach their potential contribution. 
One of the key ways in which a polycentric approach can contribute to progress even in a highly 
centralized atmosphere is that it “also captures the important idea that different resources (e.g., land, 
water, air, etc.) have different governance dynamics, implying that resource attributes, social dynamics 
and institutional arrangements (defined as rules and norms) will have important bearing on resource 
sharing, conservation and distribution” (Forsyth and Johnson 2014:1104). In this sense, polycentrism can 
also allow for recognition of additional attributes of resources beyond their economic or environmental 
use, allowing for the interaction of cultural, social, or religious norms as part of governance (illustrated in 
Mosse 1997). But more importantly, given the fact that different environmental challenges must be dealt 
with differently (using different rules of thumb, approaches, and institutional forms), polycentrism helps 
to devolve action to those most likely affected, with examples abounding even of polycentric orders 
helping to overcome the boundary problem of certain resources (Hagendra and Ostrom 2012).4  
 
4 The boundary problem is succinctly described as “matching the boundary of those who benefit and those who 




Elinor Ostrom herself was to make clear that a polycentric approach did not necessarily mean a knee-
jerk genuflection to local governance for environmental protection, but rather an acknowledgement that 
various strata of governance have their own roles in common pool resource management (Andersson and 
Ostrom 2008).  The key function of such polycentrism would then not be either the iron-clad rule of the 
local in place of the national, but rather the creation of a series of laboratories which provide for “greater 
experimentation, learning, and cross-influence among different levels and units of government, which are 
both independent and interdependent” (Cole 2011:395). The precursor to any such small-scale, 
governmentally-focused experimentation would have to be some degree of decentralization from the 
center to the regions, a process which would seem to be easier to achieve within a federal system than in 
a unitary state. Only by such devolution of practice could some tangible progress be achieved, and possibly 
lead to true polycentrism, i.e., the inclusion of non-state and informal/local actors in their own governance 
networks. 
 
III. …and the Russian Approach 
The challenges of environmental policymaking in Russia were summed up by Martus (2017a:137), 
speaking specifically of Lake Baikal but in a manner applicable to all of Russia, as “a policy process 
characterized by high levels of intervention from political leadership, frequent changes in direction, and 
an insular decision-making context with only limited input from environmental actors.” Environmental 
policymaking in Russia can be divided into three distinct periods of its post-Soviet evolution, starting with 
the enshrining of environmental protections in federal law from 1991 to 1993, a shift to de facto local 
solutions as the center of governance collapsed from 1994 to 1999, and a complete and total reversal 




During the first phase accompanying the transition from communism towards a market-based 
economy, economic concerns surrounding the transformation dominated but environmental protection 
was accepted as part of the package of reforms necessary to successfully transition Russia. As Henry and 
Douhovnikoff (2008:439) noted, “environmental protection gained further stature following the collapse 
of the Soviet system. One of the first laws passed by the newly independent Russian Federation was the 
1991 Federal Act on the Protection of the Natural Environment… the Ministry of the Environment [was 
created and] Russia also progressively, if mostly rhetorically, committed itself to the principle of 
sustainable development.” While this represented the height of power for Russian environmental policy 
at the federal level (Glushenkova 1999), there was a corresponding lack of capacity and funding, meaning 
the national environmental approach changed to stress “not improvement of the environmental situation 
but, rather, its stabilization and conservation of that which has not yet been destroyed” (Kotov and 
Nikitina 1993:13). As part of this approach, the Act on Protection also empowered citizens and activists in 
the environmental sphere and gave them legal protections, in the hopes of deputizing them as stewards 
of the local environment (Bond and Sagers 1992).  
The second phase of Russia’s environmental policymaking saw an overall “systematic eroding of 
national environmental institutions… through a period of institutional turbulence” (Mol 2009:229). By 
1996, the Ministry had been downgraded to “committee” status, which it had held before the Soviet 
Union’s collapse (Peterson and Bielke 2001), and a move towards decentralization of environmental 
protection had begun in earnest. This decentralization did not follow any organized plan, however, but 
was rather the consequence of Moscow’s inability to fund any environmental initiatives; indeed, as an 
extensive debate about the relative merits of overall policymaking from the center or the periphery has 
illustrated (Reisinger 2013), the decentralization across the board observed in the 1990s was really a form 




staving off economic disaster, the imperatives of growth dominated, and any sense of coordinated 
environmental policymaking was shoved aside (Esty 1997).  
Given the slow progress of economic institutional reform – i.e., the little progress made on property 
rights – such a de facto decentralization could have gone seriously awry in such a dysfunctional 
institutional environment (Kotov and Nikitina 1993); in particular, it was surmised that regional governors 
and local authorities were even less accountable than Moscow and much more corrupt (Glushenkova 
1999), while Bahry (2005) noted that the center’s inability to provide basic institutions meant that regions 
had little sovereignty to develop economic bases independent of Moscow. But despite this state of affairs, 
the tentative decentralization of environmental functions appeared to be fairly successful in tough 
circumstances (Kotov and Nikitina 2002), with local administrations “being the only institutions which… 
perform environmental protection activities regionally and local” (Glushenkova 1999:161). While much of 
the environmental progress that Russia made during this time came from de-industrialization rather than 
a shift to a new green growth path (Oldfield 2000), the shift to the regions allowed for much more 
experimentation in environmental policies (Henry and Douhovnikoff 2008) and made the lack of an 
effective federal regulatory system less pressing (Crotty 2003). Of course, the diversity of regions meant 
that there was also a diversity of approaches, from a patchwork of initiatives and continued reliance on 
the federal government in Murmansk (Hønneland and Jørgensen 2003) to a shift towards ecological 
protection and away from natural resource extraction in Samara (Crotty 2003). More importantly, there 
was a move towards private initiative, as the “diminishing power of the environmental state” meant that 
environmental protection shifted to newly forming coalitions of firms and environmental NGOs in various 
regions, setting standards and demanding region-specific environmental improvement (Aksenova and 
Nedelkov 2002). Despite a lack of funding or capacity (in its traditional sense, that is, well-trained staff 




indeed, the actors involved showed high levels of capacity with regard to local knowledge and often 
tailored their decisions towards actions which did not require large amounts of funding (Graybill 2007). 
This heyday of environmental experimentation was to come to an abrupt halt in the last (and 
continuing) phase of Russian environmental policymaking, as the ascendance of Vladimir Putin as 
President in 2000 led to a new equilibrium of highly centralized decision-making. Almost immediately 
upon his assumption of power (ten days after, to be exact), Putin issued a decree dissolving the State 
Committee for Environmental Protection and bringing its functions (as well as that of the Forestry Service) 
under the purview of the Ministry for Natural Resources (Peterson and Bielke 2001). With a move back to 
Moscow, regional environmental staff was cut substantially, but implementation of federal directives was 
still expected to be done by regional governmental entities (without any say in the creation of these same 
directives). In the fact of this power shift, informal coalitions in the regions continued to form, uniting 
behind the threat of extreme centralization to reach some tentative progress on environmental 
assessments at the local level (Cherp and Golubeva 2004) and especially in the realm of forestry (Libman 
and Obydenkova 2014). Unfortunately, these small-scale initiatives had little effect in the face of a federal 
apparatus focused on resource extraction rather than protection. As Mol (2009:239) noted, the Russian 
governance of the environment at the federal level, rather than embedding environmental quality into 
the policy process, had undergone a process of “environmental deinstitutionalization” in the 2000s: 
“formally, environmental protection institutions are still present. However, these institutions are de facto 
no longer functioning as an authoritative structure with rules and resources that direct environmental 
reform.”  
Tokunaga (2010) called attention to the drivers behind this state of affairs, noting that Russian 
policymakers were essentially focused on short-term ecological improvement so long as this did not 
conflict with the imperatives of extraction and resource use, a centralized approach that regional actors 




Moreover, whereas the smaller private enterprises in the region were driving environmental 
improvement in the late 1990s and to some extent still in the 2000s (Kotilainen et al. 2008) - and while 
Russia still has an active non-governmental sector of civil society organizations dedicated to the 
environment (Henry 2010) - it has more often been the large, state-owned behemoths who used 
environmental regulation to consolidate their positions and force out foreign competition (Tokunaga 
2010). Indeed, although Russia instituted a highly centralized (and essentially closed) process for 
environmental policymaking after 2000 – replete with a labyrinth of compliance and bureaucracy - 
politically connected businesses have been able to circumvent or vitiate environmental restrictions or 
utilize them to their own benefit (Martus 2017b). Rather than having to deal with regional authorities and 
local concerns, the re-centralization of Russian environmental policymaking has allowed state businesses 
to bypass governors and deal with the rest of the state directly. This has been aided and abetted by a 
muzzling of civil society, with environmental activists based in Moscow and St. Petersburg (or receiving 
Western funding) in particular targeted as “anti-Russian” (Newell and Henry 2016). 
Applying Polycentrism in Russia: The Role of Governors? 
As just shown, Russia’s post-Soviet transformation environmental policymaking has been dominated 
by the political process and especially the political institution of the executive: the center eased up on 
control of policymaking when it was unable to actually fund environmental protection, but the economic 
stabilization post-1998 resulted in a re-centralization of environmental policy. Apart from the issues of 
institutional volatility and their effect on the environment, the equilibrium which Russia now finds itself 
in is sub-optimal, as the centralized apparatus has allowed the government to set aside Russian-wide and 
localized environmental goals in pursuit of industrial production or resource extraction. Finally, this 
centralization has also provided a pathway for interests to grapple for control of the regulatory process, 
and environmental scientists, once a preeminent group during the Soviet years, are now seen as just 




These outcomes could have been predicted by any number of studies on public choice or 
environmental policymaking, pointing a way towards a different structure of environmental governance 
in Russia. Indeed, one of the issues in fashioning appropriate environmental responses at a central level 
can be traced directly to the sprawling landmass that is Russia, stretched out over eleven time zones and 
with a climate that runs from subtropical in Sochi to the tundra in the north near Arkhangelsk. The sheer 
size and diversity of ecological challenges across the country should make apparent the limits of 
centralized decision-making (even in a weak and uneven institutional environment). This suggests that a 
much more decentralized approach to environmental policy, along the lines of Ostrom (2009), would be 
more effective in improving Russia’s environmental performance across a broad host of indicators and 
geographic spaces.  
Applying the framework developed by the Ostroms to Russia would likely resemble a return to the 
status quo of the 1990s, where localities had much more of a say in environmental policymaking, but with 
a further de-scaling of environmental powers to emergent actors in local business, environmental NGOs, 
and local stakeholders. In addition, to harmonize with the successful rules of common pool resources, it 
would also require the federal authorities to recognize the right of regions, municipalities, and localities 
to create and devise their own environmental rules, including in cooperation with business and NGOs. 
Simply put, there are few avenues for polycentrism in Russia, as the combination of a tightly centralized 
regime with scant attention to property rights means that movement for private actors is restricted (along 
with, as noted, the attempts to silence environmental activists). The situation was compounded by the 
centralization of governance in Russia as part of the 2004 gubernatorial reforms, which eliminated the 
direct election of governors and instead had them appointed by the President.  
However, this re-centralization only lasted eight years, as there was a reversal of the reform in 2012, 
allowing again for direct election of governors. Such a change may have been partly cosmetic, as the 




monitored by the Kremlin (see Goode 2013 for an excellent summary), redefining the contract between 
regional leaders as part of the national electoral structure under a strong executive (Golosov 2012). But 
even such a tightly controlled process has created a greater diversity of governors than under the previous 
regime, with the political standing of a specific appointee both at home and in Moscow widely varying 
from governor to governor (Golosov and Konstantinova 2016); some have been able to consolidate local 
power bases, some have had relatively lower profiles or have had only weak ties to their regions (a 
common problem during the direct appointment of governors), and some have wielded greater influence 
at the federal level.  
This variation in influence has formed a sort of de facto decentralization, as governors which are more 
influential in Moscow may act in a more independent (decentralized) manner on various policies and may 
have greater power in swaying even more local election process such as mayoral contests (Panov 2016). 
Such an effect already has some evidence: Beazer (2015), examining economic performance in various 
parts of Russia, showed that regions which had little political competition pre-reform were bolstered by 
the newfound favor shown by the center and saw better economic outcomes. Of course, this is not to say 
that influential governors are able to translate their influence into autonomy across all facets of decision-
making, as even during the current pandemic, governors were not given freedom in deciding on 
operations of major industrial enterprises and business and administrative activities vital for their region 
(President of the Russian Federation Decree 2020b). In addition, during the meetings of the State Council, 
an advisory body to the head of the state on issues of high priority in internal and external policies, each 
governor’s activities may be given a “valuation” that may have implications for the future of his/her 
position as a governor (Orlov 2020). This suggests that the ability to have high influence across-the-board 
may still be limited for governors.  
However, in an arena where the center has exhibited little appetite for progress, like the environment, 




has displayed little interest in following through on broad-based environmental commitments, 
subordinating them to utilization (rather than protection) of natural resources and outsourcing (as noted) 
implementation of environmental decrees to underfunded regional authorities. Combined with the 
benefits of local accountability via local elections (Beazer and Reuter 2019), influential governors could 
actually have the power to act as another pole in a polycentric system, allowing for flexibility outside of 
the formal governmental sphere, creating space for local decisions (and not just implementation of federal 
regulations), and, eventually, delivering better environmental outcomes.5 Moreover, the effects of this 
influence could be heightened during a crisis (as in a pandemic), as the center is even more preoccupied 
(Burns and Tobin 2018), creating additional space for governors to allow local, decentralized action. 
 
IV. Russia in the Time of Coronavirus 
The first case of COVID-19 was registered in Russia in the end of January 2020, but the number of 
infected did not begin to rise sharply until the end of March 2020. As of the end of December 2020, Russia 
had the highest number of registered coronavirus cases in Europe and the fourth highest in the world 
after the US, India, and Brazil.6 Almost half of all cases in Russia were (and continue to be) registered in 
Moscow. 
Formally, a lockdown was never introduced in Russia but, in response to an increasing number of 
COVID-19 cases, on March 25, 2020, President Putin signed a decree introducing “non-working” days in 
Russia (President of the Russian Federation Decree 2020a). However, the “non-working” days decree 
comprised a set of policies very similar to the lockdowns being instituted elsewhere, including a temporary 
 
5 A common issue heard with a return to 1990s-style devolution is that it will just create corrupt and centralized 
governance structures similar to the Kremlin in the regions, just on a smaller scale. This argument was conclusively 
examined in Gel’man and Ross (2016), who concluded that the threat of “sub-national authoritarianism” in Russia 
had receded dramatically since the 1990s and in particular the current federal structure would prevent such 
eventualities at the scale seen in the first decade of transition. 




suspension of flights, restriction of entry to the country, and cancellation of mass cultural and sport events 
(all of this was accompanied by the mobilization of the healthcare system). Aid measures for vulnerable 
businesses and population groups were introduced countrywide shortly thereafter in a flurry of legislation 
at the beginning of April.  
An interesting feature of the COVID-related policies in Russia has been a temporary decentralization 
of decisions from the federal center to the regional authorities. The regime of temporary decentralization 
came into force from April 2, 2020, when the President’s decree put the decisions and policy 
implementation for preventing the spread of coronavirus on the shoulders of regional governors 
(President of the Russian Federation Decree 2020b). In particular, the governors were given the right to 
decide the scope and duration of prophylactic and restrictive measures in their region, to limit business 
activity, and to regulate the movement of individuals and transportation vehicles, except for the 
administration and business activities that are vital for a region (President of the Russian Federation 
Decree 2020b).7  
According to the decree, the regional governors could also potentially regulate the operation of major 
industrial enterprises and scientific and educational organizations in their region, though only upon 
agreement with the Federal Government. As a result, most Russian regions introduced self-isolation 
regimes and restrictions on non-essential activity (including introducing distance learning programs) while 
stopping short of restricting the operations of the major industrial enterprises which are one of the 
sources of air pollution in Russia. Subsequently, governors were also allowed to decide when and how to 
exit the self-isolation regime and to develop recovery measures to support the affected businesses in their 
territory (President of the Russian Federation Decree 2020d).  
 
7 According to the President’s Decree (2020b), such activities include public services, medical support, food supply, 




For most governors, the new powers delegated during the coronavirus epidemic came unexpectedly. 
Indeed, some governors, unaccustomed to the autonomy afforded by the pandemic and unable or 
unwilling to bear responsibility for these decisions, decided to resign directly after the “non-working” days 
introduction and decentralization of power (Goryashko et al. 2020; Smeltzer 2020).8 This surge of 
resignations also could be tied to political strategy for each individual governor: according to Russian 
legislation, a governor who was dismissed from his/her position by the President cannot participate in the 
following election, and with the next regional elections scheduled for September 2020, governors whose 
term is about to expire can resign and thus allow for prolonging their mandate without having to deal with 
the consequences of the pandemic. To utilize this strategy, a governor needs to resign at least three 
months before the elections, meaning that post-lockdown was a perfect time to avoid any consequences 
of their newfound autonomy while retaining the option to run again in September (when, likely, autonomy 
would once again be circumscribed).  
As a result of this temporary decentralization, the strictness of self-isolation policies varied from 
region to region. For instance, in Moscow, a system of electronic permits was introduced to restrict 
movement within the city (Moscow Mayor Decree 2020). About 20 Russian regions have followed the 
example of Moscow and introduced mandatory self-isolation, while other regions issued merely 
recommendations on self-isolation. Non-essential businesses and services have been closed and remained 
closed in Moscow even after the abolishment of “non-working” days, while in most regions, the policies 
have been less strict (Roache 2020). In fact, preliminary estimates of the COVID-19 effects on the Russian 
 
8 According to Russian legislation, since 2012, in most regions of Russia, except for several ethnic republics and 
autonomous regions, governors are elected by voters for a period of five years. However, to participate in the 
elections, a candidate who is not nominated by any political party should get a certain number of supporting 
signatures from the voters in the region, while a candidate who is nominated by a political party should get 
supporting signatures from the members of the municipal parliaments in the region. Before the elections, the 
President can have consultations with the political parties who nominate candidates or with candidates who self-
nominate themselves. In recent years, most candidates for regional governor are nominated by the dominant 




economy show that in May 2020, as compared to December 2019, production sectors were not affected 
substantially, while services and retail suffered much more, confirming that the self-isolation policies 
mostly had an effect on small business and services sectors but not on industry (Centre of Development 
Institute 2020). 
V. Data and Methodology 
a.  Data sources 
To understand the impact of decentralization and lockdown on pollution, we utilize several novel data 
sources across both environmental metrics and political institutions (Table A1 in appendix presents 
summary statistics on all data used in the paper).  
The first source we draw on is the Air Quality Open Data Platform which collects daily data on the 
PM10, PM2.5, CO, SO2, and NO2 emissions, as well as on meteorological conditions, including mean daily 
temperature, humidity, wind speed, and atmospheric pressure in 380 cities around the globe.9 For Russia, 
data on air quality are collected for six industrial cities with the population over one million, including 
Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Nizhniy Novgorod, Chelyabinsk, Krasnoyarsk, and Novosibirsk.10 Table A2 in 
appendix shows the mean AQI for the Russian cities in the studied period, February 22-June 30, 2020. 
Missing data on meteorological conditions are complemented by the data from the Federal Service for 
Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring of Russia. All pollution data is measured as the Air 
Quality Index (AQI) according to the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standard (see EPA 2018). 
We use mean daily AQI and maximal daily AQI. The AQI index takes values from 0 to 500 that are divided 
into six categories according to the levels of risk for human health: good air quality (AQI 0-50), moderate 
 
9 Data are available at https://aqicn.org/data-platform/covid19/ (last accessed July 1, 2020). 
10 Data on PM2.5 and PM10 are also available for Tomsk. However, the information on other pollutants such as CO, 
SO2, and NO2 is missing for this city. Differently from other cities in the sample, Tomsk also has a population lower 




air quality (51-100), unhealthy for sensitive groups (101-150), unhealthy (151-200), very unhealthy (201-
300), and hazardous air quality (301-500).  
The second data source is the data on the regional governors’ influence scores recently made available 
by Orlov (2020). The scores are calculated monthly based on the average of an evaluation by 27 Russian 
experts, including representatives of academia, regional NGOs, and regional media; the question asked is 
"How would you evaluate the influence of each Russian governor at the federal level (i.e. President's 
Administration; Government of the Russian Federation; Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation; party 
and business elites), using a ladder from 1 (very low influence) to 10 (very strong influence)?"11 In our 
sample, the highest influence score belongs somewhat unsurprisingly to the Governor of Moscow, while 
the lowest accrues to the Governor of Novosibirsk region (see Table A2 in appendix). Importantly for our 
econometric analysis – and in line with the reality of Russian politics - there is substantial variation in the 
influence scores of governors between regions over time and even within one region (Figure 2), meaning 
that this is by no means a time invariant indicator.   
Figure 2. Governors’ influence score, August 2018-June 2020. 
 





Source: Authors’ construction based on Orlov (2020). Notes: The governor influence score is measured on a scale 
from 1 (the lowest influence) to 10 (the highest influence). 
 
Finally, we employ the Yandex Self-Isolation Index, recently developed by Yandex, the leading 
technological company in Russia which offers applications and services for both business and private 
users, including a search engine, navigation products, transportation services, logistics, human resources 
services, corporate health insurance, and online sales registers.12 Yandex search data have previously 
been used in research on climate change in Russia, see Losch et al. (2019), but their self-isolation index 
was launched in February 2020 and has not been utilized before. The Index is calculated based on the use 
of various services and mobile applications of Yandex and ranges from 0 (no self-isolation) to 5 (complete 
self-isolation). The index shows the daily level of urban activities in the period from February 22, 2020 till 
June 30, 2020. The index compares urban activities during the coronavirus period to activities in a typical 
 
12 In the Russian market, the share of Yandex is 42% (April 2020), according to StatCounter Global Stats (2020). Data 
on the Yandex Self-Isolation Index are described at https://yandex.ru/company/researches/2020/podomam (last 




day before the coronavirus outbreak.13 The value of 0 corresponds to a rush hour during a typical workday 
and the value of 5 corresponds to quite night hours during a typical day. Figure 2 documents the level of 
this index in Russia from March 2 till June 30, 2020. 
Figure 3. Self-isolation in Russia. 
 
Source: Authors’ construction based on the Yandex Self-Isolation Index for the whole of Russia. Notes: The Yandex 
self-isolation index is measured on a scale from 0 (no self-isolation) to 5 (complete self-isolation). The index is 
calculated as an average of self-isolation indices in the Russian cities with the population over 1 mln. Black bars 
correspond to weekends and public holidays, while grey bars correspond to workdays. The period between the 
dashed lines is the “non-working days” policy period (28.03.2020-11.05.2020). 
 
b. Case selection 
We use a panel data set of five Russian cities, including Saint Petersburg, Nizhniy Novgorod, 
Chelyabinsk, Krasnoyarsk, and Novosibirsk, during the period February 22 to June 30, 2020, to analyze the 
role of regional governors’ influence in the federal politics and self-isolation on pollution. As shown in 
Table A3 in the appendix, the five cities in our sample are representative of other Russian industrial cities 
in terms of most economic characteristics, including in the influence score of the governor, size (area), 
fixed assets investment, total fixed assets, value added in mining, manufacturing, energy sector, and 
 
13 A typical day activity is defined as the average level of urban activity in the days before the coronavirus outbreak 






































































































































































































































































construction and retail revenue.14 The sample cities are slightly larger in population and have a higher 
average nominal monthly wage compared to the remaining 11 cities in Russia, but these differences are 
likely due to the inclusion of Saint Petersburg in the sample. The results without Saint Petersburg are 
available in Table A9. Similarly, Moscow is an extreme outlier in terms of most socioeconomic 
characteristics, and it is thus excluded from the main analysis.15 
As noted in Section I, poor air quality is one of the most severe environmental problems faced by 
Russian cities and, in 2018, 58% of Russian cities had air pollution levels above national air quality 
standards.16 As noted, we acknowledge that other issues plague the Russian landscape apart from air 
quality, including water pollution and waste management issues, and these problems are not unique to 
major industrial cities (Feldman and Blokov 2012; Lyahovenko and Chulkov 2017). For instance, small cities 
often have a mono-industrial structure and face as serious environmental problems as major cities 
(Lyahovenko and Chulkov 2017). However, during the COVID-19 pandemic, we are highly constrained by 
the availability of air quality data across the Russian landmass, and thus have chosen air quality as our key 
environmental issue for both pervasive nature in Russia and our access to data on its current state.  
A final note on air quality is in order, as our chosen cities are also representative of the differences 
in initial air quality levels across various locales: according to the Russian classification of cities with high 
air pollution, there are four levels of air quality, corresponding to low, upper-middle, high, and very high 
level of pollution. By this classification, in 2019, Saint Petersburg and Nizhniy Novgorod had a low level of 
 
14 Overall, there are 16 industrial cities in Russia that have a population over one million. 
15 The case of Moscow is also exceptional in terms of the governor’s influence. The Moscow governor steadily holds 
the highest influence score and is in fact, more flexible and has more power in decision-making than other governors. 
For instance, the decisions and policies of the Moscow governor implemented in the first months of the pandemic 
often served as a focal point for other governors. Given that the governor of Moscow can be seen in many ways an 
extension of the central government, it was excluded here. 
16 This indicator has decreased over the recent decade from being 83% in 2010. However, as noted by Feldman and 
Blokov (2012), the Russian air quality standards are lower than the ones in the US and Europe, implying that the air 




pollution, Chelyabinsk and Novosibirsk an upper-middle level, and Krasnoyarsk had a high level of 
pollution, meaning we have selected cities across the distribution.17  
 
c. Econometric model and identification 
We estimate the following equation using a fixed effects regression: 
𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑑 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑚 + 𝛽2𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑑 + 𝜸′𝒘𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒅 + 𝜇𝑐 + 𝜀𝑐𝑑    (1) 
where c corresponds to a city, d corresponds to a day, and m corresponds to a month. Pollution is a set of 
AQI indicators for different types of pollution, including PM10, PM2.5, CO, SO2, and NO2. Score is the regional 
governor’s influence at the federal level measured as score from 1 (very low influence) to 10 (very strong 
influence), as noted above. Weekend is a dummy variable equal one for weekends and public holidays 
and zero otherwise. Weather is a set of meteorological conditions, including mean daily temperature (in 
°C), wind speed (in meters per second), humidity (in %), and atmospheric pressure (in mm). µ is the 
unobserved city fixed effect, and 𝜀𝑐𝑑 is a stochastic disturbance. β0, β1, β2, and γ are the model parameters. 
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. Since our sample includes only five cities (clusters), 
standard errors might be underestimated. To ensure this is not the case, we also conduct the wild cluster 
bootstrap as suggested by Roodman et al. (2019). P-values of all estimates from this bootstrapping 
confirm the main findings and are available up on request. Given that our sample is relatively short and is 
based on a very recent daily data (February 2020-June 2020), city fixed effects also serve as a proxy for 
the city-level economic performance during the studied period. 
The coefficient β1 shows to what extent the governor’s influence affects city pollution levels during 
the pandemic. We hypothesize that decentralization, i.e., a stronger power of regional governors, helps 
 
17 According to data from the Federal Service for Hydrometeorological and Environmental Monitoring and the 
Voeikov Main Geophysical Observatory. See 





to reduce pollution levels through influencing regional environmental policies. During the pandemic, one 
such policy tool that was delegated to regional governors was the lockdown (or self-isolation policy) and 
the regulations regarding the operation of non-essential businesses. To understand whether the self-
isolation policy indeed mediates the effects of governor’s influence on pollution, we introduce the 
intensity of lockdown as an additional control in Eq. (1): 
𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑑 = ?̃?0 + ?̃?1𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑚 + 𝛿𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑑 + ?̃?2𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑑 + ?̃?′𝒘𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒅 + 𝜇𝑐 + 𝜀?̃?𝑑   (2) 
In Eq. (2), isolation is the Yandex self-isolation index as described above, while the other variables are the 
same as in Eq. (1). 𝜀?̃?𝑑 is a stochastic disturbance, and ?̃?0, ?̃?1, ?̃?2, 𝛿, and ?̃? are the model parameters, 
where 𝛿 shows the effect of lockdown on city pollution.  
In Eq. (2), the estimate of coefficient ?̃?1 is the effect of governor’s influence score on pollution 
adjusting for the self-isolation policy or, in other words, the effect of governor’s influence on pollution 
that is not visible via the self-isolation policy channel. Thus, if the self-isolation policy mediates the impact 
of governor’s score on pollution, then the estimate of coefficient ?̃?1 will have a lower magnitude and 
statistical power than the estimate of coefficient β1 (MacKinnon 2008).  
One potential concern is that the observed level of self-isolation is solely due to the governor’s 
influence, implying a high collinearity between the two. However, there is a low correlation between these 
two variables (see Table A3 in appendix), suggesting that, even though regional governors affect the 
extent of self-isolation, this is only one of a myriad of possible policies through which governors may 
influence pollution.  
Potentially more troubling is the reality that the estimates in Eq. (1) are consistent and unbiased only 
if the governor’s influence score is exogenous. In the first instance, a more influential candidate may 
prefer to become a governor in a region with a lower pollution level, in order to better carry out industrial 




the governor score might also be biased due to self-selection.  However, pollution levels are likely to serve 
not as primary factors in the candidate’s decision to become a governor in a particular region. As shown 
above, candidates may have low possibilities to “choose” a region where to become a regional governor, 
as the candidates to this position are often first formally or informally approved by the federal authorities 
and regional elites. Thus, the issue of selection bias is likely to be minimal. 
On the other hand, and more plausibly, although environmental policies are mostly centralized and 
designed at the federal level in Russia, the influence of a regional governor may be endogenously 
determined by the stringency and enforcement of environmental regulations at the regional level before 
the pandemic. To account for this possible endogeneity, we use an instrumental variable approach applied 
to the fixed effects model presented in Eq. (1). A suitable instrument in this case should fulfill two criteria, 
namely that it is correlated with the governor’s influence score but is unrelated to pollution (and thus 
affect pollution only through the governor). For this examination, keeping these criteria in mind, we utilize 
the time spent by a governor in office (in years) as an instrument.18  
The reasoning behind this selection is that candidates to a governor position are often first formally 
or informally approved by the federal authorities, meaning that the newly appointed governor may have 
a high influence score initially; conversely, governors with a longer history in office may build either a 
good (or bad) reputation at the federal level leading to a higher (lower) influence score. This reality is 
confirmed in our correlation analysis, as the correlation between the governor’s influence score and the 
time spent in office is -0.233, statistically significant at 1% level and satisfying the first criterion. For the 
second portion, our instrument is also likely to influence pollution only through the governor’s score as 
regional governors are only able to influence environmental regulations once they have a high influence 
score at the federal level. Put another way, given that environmental policies are highly centralized, 
 
18 For each day in the sample period, the variable is calculated as the number of days since the start of the governor’s 




governors without a high influence score have a very limited possibility to influence and enforce 
environmental regulations at the regional level.   
As a robustness check, we also use an alternative instrument, namely the governor’s age rather than 
their tenure in office (for each day in the sample period, the variable is calculated as the number of days 
since the governor’s date of birth divided by 365). Much like governors who have been on the job longer, 
older governors are survivors and may know the rules of the game better to be able to build influence at 
the federal level quickly. In our sample the correlation between the governor’s influence score and the 
governor’s age is 0.206 and is statistically significant at 1% level. Like length of time in office, the 




This section provides evidence on the relationship between the power of regional governors and 
pollution, and on the mediating role of self-isolation policy during coronavirus in this relationship. We first 
briefly discuss the correlation between governors’ score and pollution and the results of our regressions, 
following with a discussion on the possible causal mechanisms at play (including, in line with our theory 
above, how governor influence may have created a space for polycentrism).  
In Figure 4, we present the correlation between the governor influence score and the particulate 
matter PM2.5 concentration. The scatter plot is based on six Russian industrial cities, including Chelyabinsk, 
Krasnoyarsk, Nizhniy Novgorod, Novosibirsk, and Saint Petersburg, and Moscow. As shown, in the group 
of regional centers, a governor’s influence in federal politics is negatively correlated with pollution, while 
for Moscow, this correlation is mildly positive. As shown in Table A4, the corresponding correlation 
coefficients are -0.438 for regions (statistically significant at 1% level) and 0.057 for Moscow (not 




decentralization which took place during the first wave of the pandemic, the power/influence of regional 
governors, and the environmental outcome of lower pollution.  
Figure 4. Correlation between the governor influence score and PM2.5. 
 
Source: Authors’ construction. Notes: PM2.5 is measured as the mean daily AQI according to the US Environmental 
Protection Agency standard. The governor influence score is measured on a scale from 1 (the lowest influence) to 
10 (the highest influence). Cities included are Chelyabinsk, Nizhniy Novgorod, Saint Petersburg, Krasnoyarsk, 
Novosibirsk, and Moscow. 
We next present the regression results for this relationship for several major pollutants in Table 1. As 
noted above, the governor’s score is likely to be endogenous (confirmed econometrically in Table 1), and 
therefore we focus on the results of the fixed-effects IV estimation (while the fixed effects estimation 
results without IV are shown as a reference). Firstly, the results suggest that the instrument employed for 
the estimation, time spent by a governor in office, is not weak and performs well. In terms of our variables 
of interest, as shown in Table 1, a higher influence score of a regional governor is indeed associated with 
lower pollution (again, given the special nature of the capital, Moscow is excluded from all regressions). 
This result confirms the graphic analysis also for other pollutants, including PM10, CO, SO2, and NO2. In 




quality indices for PM10, PM2.5, CO, SO2, and NO2 decrease by 43.6, 84.1, 6.4, 13.1, and 19.5 points, 
respectively. In relative terms, this means a decrease in pollution by 139%, 136%, 107%, 120%, and 133%, 
respectively.19  
While such a reduction of pollution would appear to be good a priori, this environmental 
improvement is substantial even if placed in a cost/benefit framework matching benefits of pollution 
reduction with the costs of pollution abatement. Table 2 shows the current (as of 2018) costs of the 
regulatory budgets in each of the cities under examination here and the corresponding pollution levels, 
expressing pollution costs as the regulatory expenses divided by pollution. Using this as a baseline to 
translate pollution into monetary costs, the reductions in pollution predicted by our model equate with a 
reduction in costs of approximately USD 164.4 million annually.20  
Several control variables are also statistically significant, and their effects are in line with the previous 
literature. The findings suggest that higher temperature increases pollution levels, while stronger wind 
and higher humidity decrease it. Also, in line with general trends of economic activity, pollution is lower 
during the weekends. As noted above, as a robustness check, we also provide the results with the 
alternative instrument of a governor’s age, and these results confirm the main findings shown in Table 1 
(the robustness check is shown in Table A6 in the appendix). In addition, we provide results with maximal 
daily pollution levels instead of mean daily pollution. The results are reported in Table A8 in appendix. The 
results confirm that a higher influence score of a regional governor is associated with lower pollution, but 
the impact is almost two times larger in absolute value when maximal daily pollution is used as a 
dependent variable instead of mean daily pollution; this suggests that not only was the decentralization 
 
19 These numbers are computed as follows (43.6/31.17)*100, (84.1/61.62)*100, (6.4/5.93)*100, (13.1/10.88)*100, 
and (19.5/14.59)*100. The nominator is the estimated effect of governor’s score on a specific type of pollution from 
Table 1, while denominator is the mean pollution in the sample from column (7) in Table A2 in appendix. The first 
stage results are reported in Table A5 in appendix.  
20 The total annual reduction is calculated as follows 36+35.2+27.7+31.1+34.4=164.4 mln. USD. All estimates are 
taken from Table 2. A fuller calculation of costs would also include longer-term disruptions in regional GDP, but 




of environmental policymaking good at the midpoint of the distribution, it also helped to dramatically 
reduce the right tail as well.  
Figure 5 summarizes the IV regression results on the governor score and pollution from Table 1. 
As shown, the effects on PM10 and PM2.5 are larger, but less precisely estimated, and thus the 
confidence intervals are correspondingly wider. The effects on CO, SO2, and NO2 are more precise and 
statistically different from the effect on PM2.5. One possible explanation for such finding relates to the 
nature of polycentric governance and the way in which environmental action may result in changes 
in environmental quality: at the level of regional governance, a governor is likely to have more policy 
instruments to influence the emissions of specific pollutants such as SO2, NO2, and CO compared to 
PM10 and PM2.5, which represent a mixture of solid particles in the air with the diameter of 10 mm and 
2.5 mm, respectively. Thus, particulate matter is a longer-term issue requiring sustained action across 
many actors -and is much harder to target via direct regulation – meaning an area ripe for extended 




Table 1. Governor's influence and pollution. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 PM10 PM10 PM2.5 PM2.5 CO CO SO2 SO2 NO2 NO2 
VARIABLES FE IV FE IV FE IV FE IV FE IV 
Governor influence score -21.315** -43.601*** -24.545* -84.089*** -2.064* -6.446*** -1.775 -13.073*** -4.329 -19.537*** 
 (3.669) (6.602) (10.446) (9.612) (0.754) (0.951) (2.065) (3.448) (2.926) (2.376) 
Weekend day -0.929 -1.097 0.704** -0.380 0.133 0.049 0.000 -0.292 -2.074*** -2.367*** 
 (1.625) (2.546) (0.248) (2.740) (0.518) (0.280) (0.143) (0.904) (0.442) (0.610) 
Mean daily temperature (C) -0.188 0.376 -0.067 0.994*** 0.043 0.120*** 0.130 0.320*** -0.092 0.174** 
 (0.530) (0.233) (0.512) (0.253) (0.029) (0.025) (0.148) (0.093) (0.179) (0.072) 
Mean daily wind speed 
(m/sec) -4.844* -4.950*** -6.711*** -7.252*** -0.505* -0.549*** -0.641* -0.785*** -1.495** -1.646*** 
 (1.920) (0.977) (1.452) (0.927) (0.195) (0.081) (0.267) (0.248) (0.439) (0.216) 
Mean daily humidity (%) -0.189 -0.198** -0.194 -0.293*** 0.007 -0.001 -0.079 -0.098*** -0.053 -0.080*** 
 (0.205) (0.091) (0.241) (0.096) (0.015) (0.008) (0.044) (0.034) (0.078) (0.030) 
Mean daily atmospheric 
pressure (mm) 0.210 0.133 0.284 0.160 0.022 0.014 -0.162 -0.171** 0.076 0.048 
 (0.320) (0.185) (0.401) (0.197) (0.019) (0.019) (0.170) (0.080) (0.073) (0.049) 
Ho: IV is weak; F-statistics  490.18***  364.75***  319.53***  256.87***  319.53*** 
p-value  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Ho: Governor's score is 
exogenous; P-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Observations 486 486 616 616 581 581 476 476 581 581 
R-squared (within) 0.121 0.097 0.165 0.006 0.107 0.010 0.069 -0.011 0.171 -0.031 
Number of cities 4 4 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the Air Quality Open Data Platform, Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring of 
Russia, and Orlov (2020).  
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Daily data from 22.02.2020 till 30.06.2020 are used. Cities included are 
Chelyabinsk, Nizhniy Novgorod, Saint Petersburg, Krasnoyarsk, and Novosibirsk. No data on PM10 in Krasnoyarsk and on SO2 in Chelyabinsk. The governor 










Regional budget costs on 
environmental 






































  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Krasnoyarsk 6.8 2,319,000.0 0.000003 9.5 9.3 7.3 8.2 9.1 
Nizhnyi Novgorod 6.1 92,000.0 0.000066 8.5 8.3 6.5 7.3 8.1 
Chelyabinsk 6.6 488,000.0 0.000014 9.2 9.0 7.1 7.9 8.8 
Saint Petersburg 5.4 84,000.0 0.000065 7.5 7.4 5.8 6.5 7.2 
Novosibirsk 1.0 126,000.0 0.000008 1.3 1.3 1.0 1.2 1.3 
Total 25.9 3,109,000.0 0.000008 36.0 35.2 27.7 31.1 34.4 
Total reduction in %    139.0 136.0 107.0 120.0 133.0 
Source: Authors' calculations. Notes: Data on regional costs on environmental protection and total air pollution are from the Russian State Statistics Service and the regional Ministries 
of Finance. Exchange rate is 69.36 Rub/USD (as of 31.12.2018). All columns represent amounts per year. Column (3) is computed by dividing column (1) by column (2). Columns (4)-(8) 










Figure 5. The effects of the governor’s influence score on different types of pollution. 
 
Source: Authors’ construction based on the estimates from Table 1 with the 95% confidence intervals. Notes: All 
emissions are measured as mean daily AQI according to the US Environmental Protection Agency standard. Cities 
included are Chelyabinsk, Nizhniy Novgorod, Saint Petersburg, Krasnoyarsk, and Novosibirsk. 
 
As hinted at above, during the COVID-19 pandemic, one specific instrument that was given into 
the hands of regional governors was the self-isolation policy and regulations regarding movement and 
classification of “non-essential” business activities. As seen in Figure 6 and Table A7 in appendix, self-
isolation policies reduced pollution, with an effect similar for both the regions and for Moscow. As 
shown in Table A4 in the appendix, the corresponding correlation coefficients are -0.103 for regions 









Figure 6. Correlation between the self-isolation and PM2.5. 
 
Source: Authors’ construction. Notes: PM2.5 is measured as mean daily AQI according to the US Environmental 
Protection Agency standard. The self-isolation index is measured on a scale from 0 (no self-isolation) to 5 
(complete self-isolation). Cities included are Chelyabinsk, Nizhniy Novgorod, Saint Petersburg, Krasnoyarsk, 
Novosibirsk, and Moscow. 
Could the self-isolation policy have been the reason for the reduction in pollution? Could this one 
area of decentralization, the most limited form of polycentrism and one only peripherally related to 
environmental action, be the driver of these results? To test whether this policy has a mediating effect 
on the effect of a governor’s influence on pollution, we add the self-isolation index into baseline model. 
Table 3 shows the IV estimation results with self-isolation index as an additional control and the 
governor’s time in office as an instrument. As shown in this table, when self-isolation is included into 
the model, the estimated effect of governor’s score on pollution is slightly larger in magnitude in 
absolute value in case of all pollutants. The effect also retains its significance in case of all pollutants. 
This suggests that the self-isolation policy indeed helps to mediate or even reinforce the impact of 
regional governor’s score on pollution, but by no means it is the only driver of the improvement in 




key factor driving pollution, suggesting that polycentric governance beyond merely isolation orders is 
at work. 
Table 3. Governor's influence and pollution. Self-isolation policy as a mediator. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES PM10 PM2.5 CO SO2 NO2 
Governor influence score -47.494*** -90.197*** -6.719*** -14.529*** -21.271*** 
 (7.450) (10.628) (1.023) (3.758) (2.768) 
Self-isolation index 4.230** 6.713*** 0.200 1.364* 1.389*** 
 (1.755) (2.027) (0.209) (0.734) (0.505) 
Weekend day -4.753* -6.498* -0.095 -1.534 -3.560*** 
 (2.736) (3.422) (0.372) (1.053) (0.866) 
Mean daily temperature (C) 0.563** 1.219*** 0.125*** 0.357*** 0.221*** 
 (0.269) (0.289) (0.028) (0.105) (0.080) 
Mean daily wind speed (m/sec) -5.051*** -7.464*** -0.553*** -0.823*** -1.681*** 
 (0.995) (0.957) (0.081) (0.249) (0.225) 
Mean daily humidity (%) -0.129 -0.195** 0.001 -0.084** -0.063** 
 (0.088) (0.099) (0.009) (0.038) (0.029) 
Mean daily atmospheric pressure (mm) 0.212 0.255 0.017 -0.163** 0.064 
 (0.183) (0.198) (0.019) (0.082) (0.049) 
Ho: IV is weak; F-statistics 511.20*** 343.61*** 267.80*** 218.73*** 267.80*** 
Ho: Governor's score is exogenous; P-
value 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 482 611 576 472 576 
R-squared (within) 0.103 0.001 0.006 -0.016 -0.054 
Number of cities 4 5 5 4 5 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the Air Quality Open Data Platform, Federal Service for 
Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring of Russia, Orlov (2020), and the Yandex Self-Isolation Index.  
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. IV estimation results are reported. Governor’s time in office is used as an 
instrument for governor’s influence score. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Daily data from 22.02.2020 
till 30.06.2020 are used. Cities included are Chelyabinsk, Nizhniy Novgorod, Saint Petersburg, Krasnoyarsk, and 
Novosibirsk. No data on PM10 in Krasnoyarsk and on SO2 in Chelyabinsk. The governor influence score is 
measured on a scale from 1 (the lowest influence) to 10 (the highest influence). The self-isolation index is 
measured on a scale from 0 (no self-isolation) to 5 (complete self-isolation). 
 
Overall, our findings suggest that greater power in hands of regional governors has the potential 
to reduce pollution and deliver better environmental outcomes. COVID-19 provided a natural 
experiment to support this finding, as more decentralized policymaking during the pandemic saw air 




governors in time of pandemic mediated the effect of a regional governor’s power and influence in the 
federal politics, but the environmental effects could only partially be attributed to the lockdown policy 
itself. Thus, we may conclude that the coronavirus pandemic revealed the environmental benefits of 
decentralization of governance in Russia, although, as this early stage, we cannot specify exactly what 
form the specific governance in each city took. Indeed, continuing the explore the various types of 
polycentrism which arose to address environmental challenges in Russia is an ongoing project. 
 
VIII. Conclusions 
The travails of Russian environmental policymaking have been well-covered in the literature but 
mainly from the standpoint of desirable policies and available instruments rather than as an 
institutional issue to overcome. This paper took a different view, examining Russia’s environmental 
policies and institutions as part of a polycentric order containing various decisionmakers and 
stakeholders, all with their roles to play, and posited that there could be major benefits to 
environmental outcomes from decentralizing the highly centralized decision-making process in Russia. 
Our econometric analysis, using novel data and new variables to proxy for limited decentralization 
during the coronavirus pandemic of 2020, confirmed that Ostrom’s (2009) framework can indeed 
provide a way forward for Russia: greater local control, even in a short space of time, resulted in 
improved environmental outcomes (even though it had little effect on formal policymaking). This result 
held even when controlling for the major shock which would have been expected to reduce economic 
activity, namely the lockdown accompanying the pandemic.  
A host of research could follow on from this paper. In the first instance, one could backdate the 
gubernatorial influence index to see if this relationship – between influence and environmental 
progress - held in previous years, or perhaps explore the use of other de facto decentralization metrics 




decision-making, and a further extension would be to expand this work beyond Russia, comparing 
various degrees of decentralization across a panel dataset. Such an empirical analysis of Ostrom’s 
framework could also delve into other subtleties not explored here, such as there are different poles 
in a polycentric order which are more important than others. A panel approach could also control for 
different levels of property rights which, as noted in our introduction, are low but uniform across 
Russia.  We acknowledge that it is also interesting to check if our arguments hold beyond the major 
industrial cities and for other indicators of environmental quality in Russia. While we cannot address 
this issue in our analysis due to data availability constraints, we encourage future research in this 
direction, as well as identifying the specific polycentric mechanisms at work, i.e., is it only occurring at 
the regional governor’s level (probable during a short time span), or is shifting the burden of 
environmental action to private and local actors? 
In any event, the policy recommendations which follow from this paper for Russia appear quite 
straightforward, namely that Russia might benefit from a substantial decentralization of its 
environmental policymaking in the years to come; more importantly, policymaking itself might be 
secondary to allowing the space for environmental experimentation at the regional and local level to 
emerge, focused on solutions rather than policies. This finding is in contrast with Zhang et al. (2018), 
who argue that the centralization of environmental regulation leads to a lower level of emissions in 
China; in the Russian case, even if regional governors with no interest in the environment come into 
power, their lack of top-down imposition may still allow for the space for polycentric governance to 
emerge and environmental outcomes to improve.21 As Hartwell (2014) argued in a presentation to 
Russian policymakers, Russia should be utilizing its regions as laboratories to experiment with various 
forms of market-based and stakeholder-based environmental protection. While there is no guarantee 
that regions may immediately be environmentally conscious – the worries of sub-national 
 
21 Thanks to both an anonymous referee and participant at the ECPR Annual Conference who asked about the 




authoritarians as in the 1990s still remain – the extant literature shows that any form of polycentrism 
may lead to gains in environmental protection (and such an approach now has some empirical backing 
via our exercise). In reality, the diversity of environmental challenges across the landmass of the 
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 Table A1. Descriptive statistics.      
VARIABLES N Mean St. dev. Min Max 
PM10 (mean daily AQI) 486 31.17 33.31 1.5 256.5 
PM2.5 (mean daily AQI) 616 61.62 41.34 2 262 
CO (mean daily AQI) 581 5.93 6.04 0.1 36.25 
SO2 (mean daily AQI) 476 10.88 9.99 0.85 97.3 
NO2 (mean daily AQI) 581 14.59 8.3 2.35 53.8 
PM10 (max daily AQI) 486 59.38 65.03 2 491 
PM2.5 (max daily AQI) 616 114.3 76.64 3 456 
CO (max daily AQI) 581 10.23 10.92 0.1 61.7 
SO2 (max daily AQI) 477 20.76 19.27 0.1 194.5 
NO2 (max daily AQI) 581 27.68 15.55 3.4 107.1 
Mean daily temperature (°C) 620 8.41 9.22 -16.5 93.3 
Mean daily wind speed (m/sec) 620 3.48 1.74 0.2 9.7 
Mean daily humidity (%) 620 61.03 17.31 21 100 
Mean daily atmospheric pressure (mm) 620 750.5 10.55 721.3 780.8 
Self-isolation index  
(0=no self-isolation; 5=complete self-isolation) 645 1.94 0.92 0.4 4 
Governor influence score  
(1=the lowest influence, 10=the highest influence) 650 5.73 0.70 4.5 7.13 
Weekend day (1=weekend or public holiday, 0 otherwise) 650 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Governor's age (years) 650 53.50 9.91 40.53 66.35 
Governor's time in office (years) 650 2.26 0.63 0.93 3.06 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the Air Quality Open Data Platform, Federal Service for 
Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring of Russia, the Yandex Self-Isolation Index, and Orlov (2020).  
Note: Daily data from 22.02.2020 till 30.06.2020 are used. The Air Quality Index (AQI) is calculated according to 
the United States Environmental Protection Agency standard. For the governor influence score, monthly data 





Table A2. Descriptive statistics by city. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Moscow 
Nizhniy 
Novgorod Chelyabinsk Krasnoyarsk Novosibirsk Saint Petersburg  
Cities except Moscow 
(columns (2)-(6)) 
VARIABLES N mean N mean N mean N mean N mean N mean N mean 
PM10 (mean daily AQI) 96 69.23 130 16.59 130 31.33 n.a. n.a. 130 56.88 96 15.90 486 31.17 
PM2.5 (mean daily AQI) 96 51.91 130 44.42 130 68.54 130 42.83 130 108.6 96 37.38 616 61.62 
CO (mean daily AQI) 96 7.41 130 4.05 95 16.68 130 0.17 130 5.41 96 6.34 581 5.93 
SO2 (mean daily AQI) 96 3.01 125 17.12 n.a. n.a. 130 6.46 125 9.73 96 10.26 476 10.88 
NO2 (mean daily AQI) 96 19.51 130 12.35 95 10.83 130 13.44 130 21.65 96 13.37 581 14.59 
PM10 (max daily AQI) 96 134.5 130 30.47 130 60.23 n.a. n.a. 130 109.5 96 29.47 486 59.38 
PM2.5 (max daily AQI) 96 95.42 130 80.15 130 128.9 130 80.01 130 202.5 96 67.80 616 114.3 
CO (max daily AQI) 96 14.64 130 6.42 95 29.41 130 0.25 130 9.08 96 11.51 581 10.23 
SO2 (max daily AQI) 96 5.87 126 32.66 n.a. n.a. 130 12.31 125 18.03 96 20.14 477 20.76 
NO2 (max daily AQI) 96 37.38 130 24.16 95 20.95 130 26.06 130 39.66 96 25.07 581 27.68 
Self-isolation index  
(0=no self-isolation; 
5=complete self-isolation) 129 2.18 129 2.07 129 1.81 129 1.95 129 1.84 129 2.02 645 1.94 
Governor influence score  
(1=the lowest influence, 
10=the highest influence) 130 8.33 130 5.93 130 5.66 130 5.28 130 4.96 130 6.84 650 5.73 
Governor's age (years) 130 61.89 130 40.7 130 47.3 130 66.17 130 49.35 130 63.98 650 53.5 
Governor's time in office 
(years) 130 9.52 130 2.59 130 1.11 130 2.58 130 2.88 130 2.13 650 2.26 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the Air Quality Open Data Platform, Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring 
of Russia, the Yandex Self-Isolation Index, and Orlov (2020).  
Notes: Daily data from 22.02.2020 till 30.06.2020 are used. The Air Quality Index (AQI) is calculated according to the United States Environmental Protection 




Table A3. Socioeconomic characteristics of the largest cities in Russia 
  
Mean of 15 cities 
with population 
over 1 mln. 
Mean of 5 sample 
cities with population 
over 1 mln. 
t test for 
differences in 
means (p-value) 
Governor’s score (mean over Feb-June 2020) 5.275 5.676 0.09 
Population (thsd. Inhabitants) 1,463.46 2,103.54 0.04 
Area (thsd. sq. meters) 0.67 0.64 0.65 
Average monthly wage (nominal value, Rub) 41,269.23 44,141.18 0.04 
Total investment in fixed assets (nominal 
value, mln. Rub) 169,227.90 191,460.40 0.65 
Total fixed assets (nominal value, mln. Rub) 2,070,252.00 2,017,560.00 0.91 
Value added, mining (nominal value, mln. Rub)  21,125.47 8,869.38 0.31 
Value added, manufacturing (nominal value, 
mln. Rub)   494,610.50 716,683.50 0.11 
Value added, energy sector (nominal value, 
mln. Rub)  63,387.94 88,328.94 0.05 
Value added, construction (nominal value, 
mln. Rub)  69,665.89 113,381.30 0.20 
Retail total revenue (nominal value, mln. Rub)  228,503.50 388,705.30 0.06 
Source: Authors' calculations based on the 2017 data from the Russian Federal State Statistical Service.  
Notes: Moscow is excluded from calculations. 15 cities with population over one million are Voronezh, Rostov-on-Don, 
Volgograd, Kazan, Samara, Perm, Ufa, Ekaterinburg, Omsk, Krasnodar, Saint Petersburg, Nizhniy Novgorod, Chelyabinsk, 
Krasnoyarsk, and Novosibirsk. Sample cities are Saint Petersburg, Nizhniy Novgorod, Chelyabinsk, Krasnoyarsk, and 
Novosibirsk. t test for difference in means is performed. H0 is no difference in means of a particular characteristic between 






Table A4. Variables correlation matrix (Moscow vs. regions). 
















Self-isolation index 0.148***  1 0.130*** 1 0.167* 1 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.058)  
PM10 (mean daily AQI) 0.082*   -0.058 -0.465*** -0.087* -0.129 -0.148 
 (0.050)    (0.165) (0.000) (0.056) (0.212) (0.150) 
PM2.5 (mean daily AQI) -0.308*** -0.121*** -0.438*** -0.103** 0.057 -0.317** 
 (0.000)    (0.001) (0.000) (0.011) (0.583) (0.002) 
CO (mean daily AQI) -0.116***  -0.032 0.079* -0.050 -0.024 0.025 
 (0.003)    (0.407) (0.057) (0.230) (0.819) (0.811) 
SO2 (mean daily AQI) -0.165***  -0.038 0.170*** 0.110 -0.158 -0.265** 
 (0.000)    (0.367) (0.007) (0.825) (0.123) (0.009) 
NO2 (mean daily AQI) 0.030  -0.143*** -0.283*** -0.158*** 0.080 -0.243** 
 (0.442)    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.441) (0.017) 
Governor’s age 0.378*** 0.048 0.206*** 0.011 0.253*** 0.020 
 (0.000) (0.229) (0.000) (0.785) (0.004) (0.825) 
Governor’s time in office 0.785*** 0.098** -0.233*** 0.034 0.253** 0.020 
 (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.396) (0.004) (0.819) 
Notes: Bivariate correlations are reported. P-values are in parentheses. Cities included are Chelyabinsk, Nizhniy 
Novgorod, Saint Petersburg, Krasnoyarsk, Novosibirsk, and Moscow. 







Table A5. First stage results for Table 1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES PM10 PM2.5 CO SO2 NO2 
Governor’s time in office  2.476*** 2.126*** 2.226*** 2.213*** 2.226*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Exogenous controls from Table 1 YES YES YES YES YES 
Ho: IV is weak; F-statistics 490.18*** 364.75*** 319.53*** 256.87*** 319.53*** 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 486 616 581 476 581 
R-squared 0.740 0.573 0.551 0.511 0.551 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the Air Quality Open Data Platform, Federal Service for 
Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring of Russia, and Orlov (2020).  
Notes: Dependent variable is the governor’s influence score. Exogenous controls from Table 1 include weekend, 
mean daily temperature, wind speed, humidity, and atmospheric pressure. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Daily data from 22.02.2020 till 30.06.2020 are used. Cities included are Chelyabinsk, 
Nizhniy Novgorod, Saint Petersburg, Krasnoyarsk, and Novosibirsk. No data on PM10 in Krasnoyarsk and on SO2 in 





Table A6. Governor's influence and pollution with the governor’s age as an instrument 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES PM10 PM2.5 CO SO2 NO2 
Governor influence score -42.711*** -83.305*** -6.451*** -12.787*** -19.562*** 
 (6.508) (9.562) (0.955) (3.423) (2.402) 
Weekend day -1.091 -0.366 0.049 -0.285 -2.367*** 
 (2.543) (2.735) (0.280) (0.901) (0.611) 
Mean daily temperature (C) 0.353 0.980*** 0.120*** 0.315*** 0.175** 
 (0.233) (0.252) (0.025) (0.093) (0.072) 
Mean daily wind speed (m/sec) -4.946*** -7.245*** -0.549*** -0.781*** -1.647*** 
 (0.975) (0.925) (0.082) (0.248) (0.216) 
Mean daily humidity (%) -0.198** -0.292*** -0.001 -0.097*** -0.080*** 
 (0.090) (0.096) (0.008) (0.034) (0.030) 
Mean daily atmospheric pressure 
(mm) 0.136 0.162 0.014 -0.170** 0.048 
 (0.185) (0.197) (0.019) (0.080) (0.049) 
Ho: IV is weak; F-statistics 489.9*** 365.26*** 320.69*** 256.8*** 320.69*** 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ho: Governor's score is exogenous; 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.044 0.000 
Observations 486 616 581 476 581 
R-squared (within) 0.098 0.010 0.010 -0.007 -0.031 
Number of cities 4 5 5 4 5 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the Air Quality Open Data Platform, Federal Service for 
Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring of Russia, and Orlov (2020).  
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Daily data from 22.02.2020 till 
05.06.2020 are used. Cities included are Chelyabinsk, Nizhniy Novgorod, Saint Petersburg, Krasnoyarsk, and 
Novosibirsk. No data on PM10 in Krasnoyarsk and on SO2 in Chelyabinsk. The governor influence score is measured 
on a scale from 1 (the lowest influence) to 10 (the highest influence). Governor’s age is used as an instrument for 






Table A7. Self-isolation and pollution. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES PM10 PM2.5 CO SO2 NO2 
Self-isolation index -0.942 -2.139 -0.499* -0.316 -0.824 
 (1.246) (1.641) (0.206) (1.127) (0.390) 
Weekend day 0.238 3.199 0.660 0.376 -1.170* 
 (1.782) (1.802) (0.615) (1.080) (0.541) 
Mean daily temperature (C) -0.752 -0.544 -0.001 0.095 -0.181 
 (0.536) (0.361) (0.012) (0.098) (0.112) 
Mean daily wind speed (m/sec) -4.703* -6.428*** -0.470* -0.617 -1.418** 
 (1.660) (1.317) (0.189) (0.267) (0.451) 
Mean daily humidity (%) -0.191 -0.180 0.002 -0.082* -0.058 
 (0.217) (0.247) (0.012) (0.030) (0.073) 
Mean daily atmospheric pressure 
(mm) 0.272 0.311 0.020 -0.162 0.075 
 (0.292) (0.391) (0.020) (0.169) (0.068) 
Observations 482 611 576 472 576 
R-squared (within) 0.100 0.141 0.101 0.068 0.160 
Number of cities 4 5 5 4 5 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the Air Quality Open Data Platform, Federal Service for 
Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring of Russia, and the Yandex Self-Isolation Index.  
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Fixed effects results are reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Daily 
data from 22.02.2020 till 30.06.2020 are used. Cities included are Chelyabinsk, Nizhniy Novgorod, Saint Petersburg, 
Krasnoyarsk, and Novosibirsk. No data on PM10 in Krasnoyarsk and on SO2 in Chelyabinsk. Self-Isolation Index is 






Table A8. Governor's influence and maximal daily pollution 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES PM10 PM2.5 CO SO2 NO2 
Governor influence score -78.394*** -134.739*** -10.854*** -28.847*** -34.093*** 
 (12.712) (17.192) (1.770) (6.615) (4.596) 
Weekend day -1.834 0.552 0.154 -0.593 -4.308*** 
 (4.947) (4.954) (0.526) (1.744) (1.176) 
Mean daily temperature (C) 0.574 1.498*** 0.209*** 0.657*** 0.353** 
 (0.451) (0.449) (0.047) (0.177) (0.139) 
Mean daily wind speed (m/sec) -9.363*** -12.622*** -1.010*** -1.738*** -3.034*** 
 (1.912) (1.693) (0.150) (0.444) (0.420) 
Mean daily humidity (%) -0.408** -0.579*** -0.011 -0.222*** -0.177*** 
 (0.175) (0.168) (0.015) (0.065) (0.058) 
Mean daily atmospheric pressure 
(mm) 0.248 0.238 0.029 -0.320** 0.101 
 (0.364) (0.362) (0.036) (0.159) (0.094) 
Ho: IV is weak; F-statistics 490.18*** 364.75*** 319.53*** 256.71*** 319.53*** 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ho: Governor's score is exogenous; 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 486 616 581 477 581 
R-squared (within) 0.093 0.023 0.018 -0.015 -0.041 
Number of cities 4 5 5 4 5 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the Air Quality Open Data Platform, Federal Service for 
Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring of Russia, and Orlov (2020).  
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Daily data from 22.02.2020 till 
05.06.2020 are used. Cities included are Chelyabinsk, Nizhniy Novgorod, Saint Petersburg, Krasnoyarsk, and 
Novosibirsk. No data on PM10 in Krasnoyarsk and on SO2 in Chelyabinsk. The governor influence score is measured 
on a scale from 1 (the lowest influence) to 10 (the highest influence). Governor’s age is used as an instrument for 






Table A9. Governor's influence and pollution (without Saint Petersburg) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES PM10 PM2.5 CO SO2 NO2 
Governor influence score -52.698*** -97.791*** -5.592*** -14.811*** -22.511*** 
 (8.539) (12.295) (1.021) (4.999) (3.245) 
Weekend day -2.307 -0.669 0.148 -0.262 -2.458*** 
 (2.649) (2.996) (0.280) (1.083) (0.708) 
Mean daily temperature (C) 0.395 0.928*** 0.088*** 0.281** 0.176** 
 (0.251) (0.273) (0.024) (0.111) (0.083) 
Mean daily wind speed (m/sec) -6.487*** -8.710*** -0.494*** -0.952*** -1.852*** 
 (1.223) (1.082) (0.086) (0.323) (0.261) 
Mean daily humidity (%) -0.233** -0.422*** -0.012 -0.137*** -0.115*** 
 (0.103) (0.105) (0.008) (0.041) (0.035) 
Mean daily atmospheric pressure 
(mm) -0.291 -0.351 -0.007 -0.327*** 0.022 
 (0.231) (0.218) (0.020) (0.115) (0.063) 
Ho: IV is weak; F-statistics 431.11*** 276.06*** 220.44*** 159.09*** 220.44*** 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ho: Governor's score is exogenous; 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 390 520 485 380 485 
R-squared (within) 0.103 -0.052 -0.008 0.003 -0.054 
Number of cities 3 4 4 3 4 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the Air Quality Open Data Platform, Federal Service for 
Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring of Russia, and Orlov (2020).  
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Daily data from 22.02.2020 till 
05.06.2020 are used. Cities included are Chelyabinsk, Nizhniy Novgorod, Krasnoyarsk, and Novosibirsk. No data on 
PM10 in Krasnoyarsk and on SO2 in Chelyabinsk. The governor influence score is measured on a scale from 1 (the 
lowest influence) to 10 (the highest influence). Governor’s age is used as an instrument for governor’s influence 
score. 
 
 
